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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 154 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 12/08/1997 
Where it occurred: Qalai Muslim, Ward 7, 
Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: soft 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
Both victims had been deminers for seven years. They had last attended a revision course 
seven months before, and had been on leave 39 days before. The ground where the accident 
occurred was described as soft. The device involved was identified as a PMN from "found 
fragments".  
The investigators decided that the two victims were assigned a breaching lane to clear. Victim 
No.1 was eager to finish investigating a signal when a rest period was announced, so hurried 
and used excessive force. Victim No.2: was not maintaining the safety distance required and 
was also injured. 
The Team Leader stated that the deminers were eager to change over roles (not to rest). 
Victim No.2 was standing behind while Victim No.1 finished prodding.  
Victim No.1 stated that he was holding a block of cement up with one hand while he exposed 
the mine he had found when the block slipped and struck the mine.  
Victim No.2 stated that he was working correctly ten metres behind his partner when the 
mine went off a meter away from their working area. He stated that it may have been a booby 




The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because of the victim's negligence. 
Victim No.1 was too eager to start his rest period and Victim No.2 was negligent because he 
was too close. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the command group be told to have close supervision of 
their deminers. They said that deminers should be reminded to maintain a 35 degree angle 
when prodding and to avoid excessive force. Also, the resting deminer should control, guide 
and correct his partner during prodding, and must maintain recommended safety distances. 
They added that the Section Leader should be disciplined for poor control and that rest 
periods should not be announced while a deminer is busy investigating a signal. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 197 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 150,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: injuries to neck, loss of sight, and left hand. 
A photograph showed the victim with eye injuries. 
A disability claim was submitted on 23rd December 1997 for the victim describing his injuries 
as a lacerated wound to his right eyelid and fragments to both eyes resulting in a 60% vision 
loss in his right eye and "left eye partial loss of vision". 
A disability payment for the victim of 150,000 Rs was made on 23rd April 1998.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 198 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.2's injuries were summarised as: injuries to face, and to right leg. 
A photograph showed Victim No.2 with injuries to his right hand, left leg, face, neck and 
shoulder.  
The demining group reported that Victim No.2 had sustained injuries to his chin, left elbow, 
shoulder, arm and left leg.  
The demining group forwarded a claim on 11th March 1998 for Victim No.2 describing his 
injuries as multiple injuries including loss of hearing in both ears. The claim was rejected 
pending an ENT (hearing) report. 
No record on a compensation payment to Victim No.2 was found in June 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
victims were working improperly and their errors were not corrected.  
Some information can be inferred from the injuries suffered. Victim No.1's eye injury shows 
that he was working with his visor raised (or not worn), while Victim No.2 appears to have 
been standing behind and to the side of his squatting partner (so explaining the range of his 
injuries). He was breaching safety distance SOPs. The blast and fragments may have been 
deflected by the concrete, and the concrete/cement may have struck Victim No.1 so 
explaining the "blunt trauma" claim. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing. 
Victim No.2's severe deafness is common of Afghan claims from this period, when insurance 
favoured such injury and testing the validity of the claims was hard.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail for Victim No.2 was prevented by 
the UN programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access 
has continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
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